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First- and third-person experiences of bodily sensations, like pain and touch, recruit
overlapping neural networks including sensorimotor, insular, and anterior cingulate
cortices. Here we illustrate the peculiar role of these structures in coding the sensory and
affective qualities of the observed bodily sensations. Subsequently we show that such
neural activity is critically influenced by a range of social, emotional, cognitive factors, and
importantly by inter-individual differences in the separate components of empathic traits.
Finally we suggest some fundamental issues that social neuroscience has to address for
providing a comprehensive knowledge of the behavioral, functional and anatomical brain
correlates of empathy.
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INTRODUCTION
We refer to empathy as that fundamental process in human
social interactions that allows the understanding of others
people sensations and emotions by sharing their sensory and
affective states. However, despite philosophers, developmen-
tal and social psychologists having long investigated empathy
(Eisenberg et al., 1987; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman,
2000), there is still no universal agreement on its definition
and on the different interrelated phenomena it subsumes (a
review of this debate: Preston and de Waal, 2002; Blair, 2005a;
de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Batson, 2009). Numerous schol-
ars suggested that empathy comprises several components and
independent but interacting mechanisms (Davis, 1996; Eisenberg,
2000; Decety and Jackson, 2004), such as sensory-affective and
emotional sharing (Preston and de Waal, 2002), cognitive per-
spective taking of others’ states (Davis, 1996; Decety and Jackson,
2004), the ability to discern the other as the source of our own
affective state (review in Singer and Lamm, 2009) and self-
regulatory mechanisms that influence the extent of the empathic
experience and the likelihood of prosocial behaviors (see Decety,
2011 for a critical discussion). Indeed, empathic reactions may
stem from feelings of sorrow for others’ pain (i.e., sympathy) to
distress for an unpleasant scene (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1996).
Social neuroscience has only recently started to investigate
the neural underpinnings of empathy being strongly influ-
enced by the shared representation accounts which postulate
that the human ability to understand others’ motor, perceptual,
and emotional states is sub-served by the activation of corre-
sponding representations in the observer (Preston and de Waal,
2002; Gallese, 2003). At the neural level, such ability could
rely on mirror-like mechanisms similar to the mirror neurons
that (in primate brain) encode both executed and observed
actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Accordingly, since their dis-
covery numerous studies in humans found shared neural
representations between self and others in the domain of
actions (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Avenanti et al., 2013; Tidoni et al.,
2013), emotions (Wicker et al., 2003; Bastiaansen et al., 2009;
Borgomaneri et al., 2012) and sensations, like pain and touch
(Keysers et al., 2010; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
Here we focus on the brain regions involved in first- and third-
person experience of pain and touch, and illustrate their peculiar
role in coding the sensory and affective qualities of these bodily
sensations. Subsequently we show how—despite such vicarious
activations seeming to occur automatically (i.e., without con-
scious and effortful processing)—they can bemodulated by inter-
individual differences in personality traits, dispositions, attitudes,
and social and cognitive forms of interpersonal evaluation of the
other. We conclude by suggesting that some fundamental issues
have to be addressed by future research to improve knowledge on
the complex relationship between behavioral and both functional
and anatomical neural correlates of empathy.
VICARIOUS NEURAL ACTIVATIONS TO OTHERS’ PAIN
AND TOUCH
VICARIOUS PAIN
Experiencing pain involves two complementary but dissocia-
ble components (Craig, 2002) encoded in distinct nodes of the
so-called “pain matrix” neural network (Melzack, 1999). The
sensory discriminative component concerns the physical qual-
ities of the stimulus (e.g., intensity) and is associated with
activity in somatosensory and motor cortices. The affective-
motivational component relates to the subjective aspects of pain
perception (e.g., unpleasantness) and is encoded by the ante-
rior insula (AI), which is known to be involved in represent-
ing and integrating internal and emotional feelings states (Craig,
2002) and by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Peyron et al.,
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2000), which is known to re-represent the emotional global
states to control, select, and prepare appropriate responses
(Medford and Critchley, 2010).
Yet, pain perception is not only a private state. Understand-
ing others’ pain is a fundamental ability in social interactions
that is sub-served by the same neural structures as those involved
in first-person experience of pain (Preston and de Waal, 2002;
Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Decety, 2011). The
sensory discriminative aspects of observed pain are associated
with activity in primary (S1) and secondary (S2) somatosensory
cortices (Bufalari et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007; Costantini et al.,
2008; Valeriani et al., 2008; Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Betti et al.,
2009; Voisin et al., 2011; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2012), as well as in
primary motor cortex (M1) (Avenanti et al., 2005), while the
affective-motivational qualities of observed pain are associated
with activity in AI and ACC (Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al.,
2004; Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al.,
2006; Saarela et al., 2007). Empathic responses in these regions
could thus reflect a process that represents bodily and affec-
tive states in the self and in the others, with the final aim to
guide homeostatic and behavioral responses (Singer and Lamm,
2009).
VICARIOUS TOUCH
Observing touch also elicits mirror-like responses. Increasing evi-
dence points to the peculiar role of somatosensory cortices in pro-
cessing sensory qualities of observed touch (Keysers et al., 2010;
Morrison et al., 2011a). S2 is active both when being touched
and observing someone else being touched (Keysers et al., 2004;
Blakemore et al., 2005; Schaefer et al., 2006; Ebisch et al., 2008).
Functional neuroimaging (Blakemore et al., 2005; Schaefer et al.,
2009, 2012) and electroencephalography (Bufalari et al., 2007;
Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012) studies showed that also S1
responds to observed touch, especially when the body is seen from
a first-person perspective (Schaefer et al., 2009) and its activity (as
indexed by early Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs)) cor-
relates with intensity (but not with the unpleasantness) of the
observed bodily sensations (Bufalari et al., 2007).
THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY FOR PAIN
AND TOUCH
SOCIAL PAIN
Fascinatingly, rather than being fixed, the empathic behav-
ioral and neural responses can be reduced or increased by a
broad range of cognitive (Lamm et al., 2007a), emotional, and
social factors (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006), such as personal
state and interpersonal relationship or appraisal of the other
in pain.
For example, in acupuncturists—who must prevent distress to
impair their ability to be of assistance—the ACC and AI neural
responses to others’ pain are significantly reduced (Cheng et al.,
2007). Similarly, being in pain oneself while observing pain in
others may reduce the vicarious activity of the somatic nodes
of the pain matrix (Valeriani et al., 2008), suggesting that being
in pain may bias the empathic relation with others towards self-
centered empathic stances.
On the other hand, adopting the perspective of a beloved per-
son in pain increases activity in ACC and AI (Cheng et al., 2010).
Conversely, affective sharing of pain of an unfair other is associ-
ated with reduced fronto-insular and ACC activity and increased
activation of reward-related areas (Singer et al., 2006). Social
in/out group membership can also modulate the brain activ-
ity related to agonistic or antagonistic motivation to empathize
and to pro/antisocial behavior. Indeed, other-oriented feelings of
sympathy and AI activity predicted the tendency to engage in
costly behavior to reduce an affiliated soccer fan’s pain, while
subjective negative evaluations of the opponent fan and nucleus
accumbens activations predicted the tendency to not make a sac-
rifice for this individual (Hein et al., 2010). Similarly, observ-
ing members of different ethnicity being in pain reduces the
sensorimotor empathic response (Avenanti et al., 2010), while
observing pain experienced by own- versus other-race individu-
als increases autonomic reactivity, ACC and AI activity (Xu et al.,
2009; Azevedo et al., 2012) as a function of the observers’
implicit racial biases (Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., 2012;
Sessa et al., 2013). The behavioral and neural empathic resonance
can also be modulated by a priori attitudes toward the target
group. Indeed, empathy ratings, AI and midcingulate activity are
stronger for the observation of pain in HIV/AIDS transfusion tar-
gets, but weaker for HIV/AIDS drug targets (Decety et al., 2010).
Thus, empathic resonant activity in empathy-related neural
networks may interact with (and be modulated by) the activity of
other neural networks relevant for social cognition such as those
involved in mentalizing, in coding reward, or in cognitive control
and emotion regulation.
SOCIAL TOUCH
The affective and social meaning of touch can modulate behav-
ioral and neural responses to observed human tactile interac-
tions. Indeed skin-to-skin contact is crucial for social interactions
sub-serving nonverbal communication of intentions and emo-
tions. Observing a face being touched by fingers enhanced the
detection of around-threshold tactile stimuli on the observer’s
face (Cardini et al., 2011), more strongly if the observers and the
observed faces belong to the same (versus different) social group
(Serino et al., 2009).
Also, the affective meaning conveyed by a hand stroking a body
increases S1, S2, and insular activity (Morrison et al., 2011a). Par-
ticularly, S1 activity is stronger when observing human-based
intentional touch (Ebisch et al., 2008) and is causal to under-
standing the affective consequences (Bolognini et al., 2013) of tac-
tile interactions between people (Rossetti et al., 2012). Even when
touch is physically experienced, S1, S2, and insular activity are
stronger when participants receive a gentle stroking performed
by a hand (with respect to a stick; Kress et al., 2011). Interest-
ingly, S1 activity is further modulated by the believed (opposite)
gender of the caresser, despite the sensory stimulation proper-
ties being the same across genders (Gazzola et al., 2012). These
results highlight the twofold function of S1 in social interac-
tions: it encodes the sensory qualities of first- and third-person
experience of bodily sensations, and is further modulated by
the attributed affective components of human tactile interac-
tions. Modulation of S1 activity related to somatic and affective
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qualities of observed sensations is probably due to feedback pro-
jections from multimodal fronto-parietal (Macaluso and Driver,
2005) and insula areas. Indeed, processing gentle touch and its
associated pleasant sensation is conveyed by the so-called tactile
C (CT) fibers (Olausson et al., 2002), which project to the insular
cortex (Bjornsdotter et al., 2010) that in turn is functionally con-
nected to the sensorimotor cortices (Deen et al., 2011). Patholog-
ically reduced CT-fiber density is associated with a less pleasant
evaluation of observed interpersonal touch, and with absent mod-
ulation of insular activity (Morrison et al., 2011b). Conversely,
in healthy participants the observation of somebody else’s arms
being stroked elicits a similar response in the posterior insula as
when one is directly feeling touch (Morrison et al., 2011a). These
results suggest that the representations of our feeling states in
insula form the basis for understanding the feelings of others.
Ebisch et al. (2011) found opposite activation patterns in pos-
terior insula for first- and third-person experience of affective
human touch and suggested this region can differentiate the stim-
ulation source (self versus other), which is consistent with its role
in mediating the sense of body ownership (Heydrich and Blanke,
2013).
THE PERSONALITY NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY
FOR PAIN AND TOUCH
EMPATHIC TRAITS
Empathic responses comprise cognitive, affective, and emotional
components (Batson, 1991), and may reflect stable personality
dispositions (trait empathy; Davis, 1996) or be linked to situa-
tional and contextual factors (state empathy; Batson et al., 1983).
From a neuroscientific perspective this suggests that distinct neu-
ral mechanisms may underpin different types of empathy-related
responses.
Indeed, empathy-related activity in the affective division
of the pain matrix correlates with scores in trait empa-
thy emotional scales (Singer et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2006;
Lamm et al., 2007a; Saarela et al., 2007; Cheetham et al., 2009;
Lang et al., 2011), such as the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), the Emotional Contagion Scale
(ECS; Doherty, 1997), and both the Empathic Concern (EC) and
Personal Distress (PD) subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI; Davis, 1996). However, a recent meta-analysis sug-
gested that empathic neural responses are better predicted by situ-
ational rather than by dispositional measures of emotional empa-
thy (Lamm et al., 2011).
Also the empathy-related activity in the sensory division of the
pain matrix shows a complex pattern of correlations with differ-
ent empathic components. The empathic sensorimotor response
is independently predicted not only by the sensory qualities of
pain, but also: (i) positively by the participants’ ability to imag-
inatively transpose into others’ feelings and states (as indexed by
IRI-PT subscale); and (ii) negatively by either the situational than
the stable tendencies to experience personal distress as a result
of others’ pain (Avenanti et al., 2009). Interestingly, also vicari-
ous pain-related activity in S1 is positively correlated with IRI-PT
scores (Cheng et al., 2008; Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012). Addi-
tionally, functional and anatomical neuroimaging studies showed
significant correlations between self-oriented emotional empathy
(as indexed by IRI-PD) and (i) vicarious sensorimotor activa-
tions to others’ pain (but only in females: Yang et al., 2009), and
(ii) reduced gray matter volume in S1 (Banissy et al., 2012). These
results thus suggest that both brain structure and vicarious activ-
ity in the sensory node of the painmatrix are independently influ-
enced by distinct functional, not purely sensory, mechanisms.
Remarkably, the role exerted by inter-individual differences in
cognitive empathy has been demonstrated also for touch-related
vicarious activity in S1. PT scores are positively correlated with
increased amplitude of early SEPs (Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012),
S1 hemodynamic responses to observed touch (Schaefer et al.,
2012), and impairments in encoding the affective valence
of others’ somatic feelings resulting from disruption of S1
activity (Bolognini et al., 2013). No associations, instead, have
been reported between vicarious somatosensory activations to
touch/pain and other trait cognitive (IRI-Fantasy Scale) or
emotional empathy scales [IRI-PD, IRI-EC, Empathic Quotient
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) or ECS (Doherty, 1997)].
Interestingly, similarly to the domain of sensations PT—but not
other IRI subscales—correlates also with S1 vicarious activity to
heard human actions (Gazzola et al., 2006).
Thus, taking into account that different experimental designs
and manipulations were used, it seems that a rather coherent pic-
ture emerges from the above-mentioned studies. Indeed, struc-
tures coding affective qualities of observed sensations are more
closely related to emotional empathy traits, while vicarious activ-
ity in structures coding sensory qualities of observed sensations is
differentially modulated by cognitive perspective taking abilities
and self-oriented empathic responses.
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE, AND EMOTIONAL ABILITIES
ON EMPATHY
The behavioral and neural empathic responses have been recently
investigated in pathological conditions affecting the social and
emotional sphere, as well as in participants with different affec-
tive styles.
Clinical studies indicate that psychopaths show cognitive
empathy and mentalizing abilities in the normal range (if
not higher) but they lack emotional reactivity and sympathy
responses (Blair, 2005b). Autistics, instead, show reduced the-
ory ofmind andmetalizing-related brain activity (Frith and Frith,
2006). Interestingly, the sensorimotor response to others’ pain is
greater in (healthy) subjects with high scores in a psychopathology
scale (Fecteau et al., 2008) and absent in individuals with Asperger
syndrome (Minio-Paluello et al., 2009).
Based on the assumption that awareness of one’s own emo-
tional states is a prerequisite for recognizing such states in oth-
ers (Decety and Jackson, 2004), alexithymic patients—who have a
deficit in identifying and expressing one’s own emotional states—
show reduced ACC activations to others’ pain, and score low
in empathy questionnaires (Moriguchi et al., 2007). Also, alex-
ithymic scores of control participants are negatively correlated
with left AI activity during imagination of a close other in pain
(Bird et al., 2010). Interestingly, insular response to the obser-
vation of a beloved in pain is also associated with the ten-
dency to regulate one’s own emotional responses on the base of
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bodily-emotional states (Mazzola et al., 2010), i.e., with “inward”
dispositional affective style (Arciero et al., 2004).
These results thus confirm that representations of our bodily
and emotional feeling states in insula and ACC form the basis for
understanding and reacting to the feelings of others.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Recent theoretical andmethodological advances in social and cog-
nitive neuroscience critically improved the conceptualization of
neurocognitive models of human empathy. Future studies might
fruitfully address some fundamental issues on the relationship
between behavioral, functional and anatomical brain correlates of
empathy.
One important issue regards the causal nature of the rela-
tionship between empathy-related behavior and brain activ-
ity. Further studies are needed to show whether changes in
empathy-related brain activity—as induced by brain stimula-
tion techniques (such as TMS or transcranial Direct Current
Stimulation)—can change empathic behavioral responses, as well
as changes in empathic behavior—as induced by focused training
or psychotherapy—can induce changes in empathy-related brain
activity. Initial findings suggest a bidirectional influence by show-
ing that (i) interfering/enhancing the activity of empathy-related
brain structures produces impairments/enhancements in empa-
thy tasks and traits (Balconi and Bortolotti, 2012; Rossetti et al.,
2012; Bolognini et al., 2013), while (ii) focused training on
empathic resonance increased vicarious activity in affective
node of the pain matrix when witnessing people suffering
(Klimecki et al., 2013).
An additional major issue is the association between anatom-
ical and functional brain organization related to empathic
personality features. Recent evidence shows that the same regions
(in particular ACC and AI) were identified by both functional
and structural neuroimaging as the neural substrate of specific
empathic traits (Yang et al., 2009; Banissy et al., 2012). Despite
the indication that structural and functional changes can be asso-
ciated (Durston and Casey, 2006), the work on the relationship
between anatomical and functional features of empathy is still
very limited, and the conclusions have to be considered with
caution.
A third main issue regards the relationship between per-
sonality dimensions, empathic traits, and vicarious brain acti-
vations to others’ emotions and sensations. Despite it being
known that different personality factors individuated by the
Big Five theory of personality (McCrae and Costa, 1991) are
related to distinct empathic components (EC is closely related
to agreeableness, PD to neuroticism, while PT shows a com-
plex interstitial relationships with the 5 factors; Mooradian et al.,
2011), there are still limited data concerning this relationship
(Marcoux et al., 2013; Schaefer et al., 2013). Gender also plays a
role in this complex relationship. Indeed, women have higher
empathic abilities, neuroticism, agreeableness, and extraver-
sion scores (Goodwin and Gotlib, 2004), and seem to have
also stronger vicarious-pain-related brain activations (Han et al.,
2008; Yang et al., 2009). However, studies investigating the inter-
play between personality, gender, and empathy-related brain
activity are still lacking and should involve highly representa-
tive samples, larger than those commonly used in neuroimaging
experiments.
In summary the available data have enhanced the under-
standing of vicarious experience at both neural and psycholog-
ical levels. However, in order to fulfill the needs of a compre-
hensive and predictive model of human empathy, further work
will have to integrate converging evidence from the molecular,
cellular, and systemic levels both in healthy and neurological
conditions.
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